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ABSTRACT. In this article we address one of the most prominent questions in historical
sociology: did economic modernization in the nineteenth century lead to societal
openness? In an attempt to answer the question we examine the chances for lower-
class grooms of marrying upwardly in ﬁve Belgian cities (Aalst, Leuven, Ghent,
Verviers, and Lie`ge). Our ﬁndings show that there is no support for a meritocracy
hypothesis. The chances of marrying out of the lower classes did not increase, in
either absolute or relative terms. Social closure strategies were eﬃcient in that they
apparently prevented upward marital mobility for lower-class grooms. As these
ﬁndings were measured in a highly advanced economic context, this study casts
strong doubts on the relationship between economic modernization, meritocracy, and
marital mobility, at least for the nineteenth century.
Searching for happiness, ﬁnding security, contracting an alliance,
conforming to social norms, the choice of a marriage partner is a key
moment in each individual’s life. But most important for this study is that
through marriage, group boundaries are reinforced, so that the study of
marriage oﬀers the possibility of examining the claim that economic
modernization has led to societal openness. That means that achieved
positions – such as one’s own social position – rather than ascribed posi-
tions – such as one’s social origin – are used to evaluate people.1 In this
article we shall examine openness in terms of the social origin of grooms
and brides, and we shall distinguish among ﬁve classes: the unskilled, the
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semi-skilled, the skilled (together forming the lower class), the middle
class, and the elite.
On the one hand, societal openness might be prompted by a change in
social structure, such as the rise of a ‘new’ middle class. For the lower
classes, then, the presence of a large middle class might have stimulated
absolute upward marital mobility. However, in contradiction to that
claim it can be argued that due to the proletarianization of the ‘old’
middle class and agricultural decline, the middle class shrank, so that the
possibilities for upward marital mobility decreased.
On the other hand, economic modernization might have changed the
preferences and criteria used for partner selection. While during the ancien
re´gime it was explicitly seen as an ideal that horizontal alliances such as
marriage should respect vertically inherited social status,2 the triumphant
nineteenth-century bourgeoisie imposed an ideology of individual merit
and competition, which meant that upward and downward marital
mobility became increasingly possible. In contradiction to that claim,
meanwhile, it can be argued that social closure – which is the process by
which certain people are excluded from participation in social groups, for
example by using criteria such as race, language, religion, geographical, or
social origin – did not fade away in the nineteenth century, and even that
it was renewed as new social or demographic classes were formed by the
agglomeration into the marriage market of diﬀerent subgroups of the
lower classes.
In this article we address both absolute and relative marital mobility.
By ‘absolute marital mobility ’ we mean the actual number of marriages
that unite people from diﬀerent social backgrounds. The number of such
mixed marriages is the product of both social structure and people’s
individual preferences. By ‘relative marital mobility ’ we mean the amount
of mobility, but this time controlled for the eﬀect of the social structure, so
that the evolution of relative mobility measures tells us whether people’s
preferences and criteria really did change. We have made the latter our
focus, as it is particularly the relationship between economic moderniz-
ation and relative mobility that is deemed to be the central issue in mod-
ernization research.3
We shall test the relationship between economic modernization and
societal openness by analysing the chances for individuals from lower-
class backgrounds of marrying out of their class. In our opinion, upward
maritalmobility of the lower classes oﬀers themost important test of trends
in marriage partner selection, because two competing claims – societal
openness as against social closure – both predict an increase of intermar-
riage within the lower classes, while only the former predicts intermarriage
among all classes. A key issue therefore is whether societal openness was
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strong enough to increase the likelihood for the lower classes of over-
coming the barrier between them and the middle classes in the marriage
market of the nineteenth century.
We must emphasize, however, that in assessing upward the marital
mobility of the lower classes we wish simply to measure the chances for
individuals from lower-class backgrounds of crossing social boundaries
through marriage. We do not claim that the new couple thereby necess-
arily ended up forming a middle-class or elite household.
We have located our analysis in the growing urban world of the time.
We examined marriage certiﬁcates from ﬁve Belgian cities, namely the two
early industrial textile cities of Ghent and Verviers ; the mining and en-
gineering city of Lie`ge ; Aalst, which was a late-industrial textile city ; and
Leuven, which was non-industrial. Those cities are not a representative
sample, as they represent some of the most modern economies of the
nineteenth century, but the database from them allows us to address
classic theories about the relationship between economic modernization
and societal openness or closure. We would even go so far as to claim that
if societal openness and meritocracy are not to be observed in those cities,
they are unlikely to be observed anywhere in the nineteenth century, in so
far as one links economic modernization and meritocracy.
1. MAR ITAL MOB I L I TY IN THE N INETEENTH CENTURY
1.1 Absolute marital mobility
This section begins with a discussion of absolute marital mobility.
A central question in the discussion is about the composition of the mid-
dle class. Most scholars would probably agree that the middle class is
composed of three main groups: the petty bourgeoisie, who were skilled
manual self-employed people, retailers, or small business owners ; farm-
ers, who together with the petty bourgeoisie formed the old middle class ;
and skilled non-manual workers such as clerks, lower managers – in fact
the ‘new’ middle class.4
Nineteenth-century transitions meant changes in both the size and the
composition of the middle class, even though many regional diﬀerences
remained.5 One of the ﬁrst changes was the decline of the old middle class.
According to Marxist writers, the proletarianization of the old middle
class led to an ever-increasing lower class. The decline of agriculture might
have had similar consequences. But as time went on the middle class be-
came dominant. Indeed, artisans emphasized the commercial dimension
of their activities, and the whole trade sector, from the most modest shops
to the new Grand Bazaar department store, grew impressively in size and
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diversity within the urban world.6 Post-industrial theory has further
claimed that a new managerial and administrative class and qualiﬁed
technical and professional staﬀ emerged with the rise of big companies
and government institutions.7 Industrial societies became middle-class
societies.
The changing size and composition of the middle class could well have
had important consequences for marriage patterns. In terms of absolute
mobility, a decrease or an increase in the size of the middle class might
have led respectively to a decrease or increase in the possibility of the
lower classes marrying into the middle class. Even though that need not
necessarily have aﬀected relative mobility, it could have brought with it
important consequences for group formation, because intermarriage by
deﬁnition unites people from diﬀerent origins, whether forced by a change
in social structure or not. Where proletarianization and agricultural de-
cline were strong in a particular region, for the lower classes the chance of
upward marital mobility declined, but where the rise of the new middle
class was strong enough that increased the chances of upward mobility for
the lower classes. The latter view echoes the Lipset and Zetterberg hypo-
thesis on intergenerational mobility, which claims that during industrial-
ization intergenerational mobility rates increase due to the increasing size
of the middle class.8
Because of the sometimes very diﬀerent evolution of social structures in
diﬀerent contexts, the lack of a comparative class scheme,9 and the focus
on relative marital mobility and on the global pattern of marital, rather
than upward, mobility among the lower classes, previous research on
absolute upward marital mobility has not provided many results directly
compatible with the aim of our research.
We would like to summarize this discussion on absolute marital
mobility by distinguishing between the proletarianization and agricultural
decline hypotheses, which together claim that absolute upward marital
mobility decreased for individuals from lower-class backgrounds, and the
‘new middle class ’ hypothesis, which suggests that absolute upward
marital mobility increased.
1.2 Relative marital mobility
Economic modernization did not aﬀect only absolute marital mobility.
According to the liberal theory of industrialism, that change was ac-
companied by an increase in equal opportunities, and it is often believed
that the rise of the new middle class oﬀered new career possibilities for
children born to lower-class families. The recruitment policy of the new
institutions was governed by principles of rational bureaucratic selection
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and achievement. Education played a more important part in determining
an individual’s career. In short, a meritocratic society was on the rise, it
seemed.10
According to that thesis, social mobility rose, and that view can be
translated into terms of marital mobility. It is often believed that modern
societal openness was visible in patterns of open partner selection too, as
social origin apparently no longer played such a major role in determining
opportunity. Moreover, other factors supported the trend towards so-
cietal openness, namely the rise of partner selection based on ‘romantic ’
considerations and new, less ‘controlled’ meeting opportunities such as
could be found in pubs or dancehalls.11
Nevertheless, some important doubts remain. First, previous empirical
research has not conﬁrmed the thesis. Although hampered by constraints
similar to those on research into absolute mobility, the conclusion of
research in many countries seems to be that there was no general trend
towards greater societal openness.12 Second, early industrial society was
diﬀerent from mature twentieth-century industrial society, in which, for
example, the educational system was fully developed. In the nineteenth
century, given the very low level of democratization of the educational
system at the time, increased social mobility through educational attain-
ment was not easy.13
All that then brings us to formulate alternative hypotheses. We start by
presenting these alternatives in general terms. First, proletarianization
and agricultural decline may also have resulted in relative marital
mobility. In contrast to the previous section, we do not refer here to the
quantitative decrease of the (old) middle class, but to qualitative charac-
teristics. For example, proletarianization and agricultural decline may
have weakened the economic position of the petty bourgeoisie and of
farmers, while not necessarily transforming them into lower-class groups.
Second, it can be expected that neither the middle class nor the elite
allowed the lower class to compete on easy terms for good positions.14
Social closure may have been a strong obstacle to upward mobility,15 and
not only in traditional society. Related to that is the idea that demo-
graphic lower-class formation determined partner-selection patterns.16
Demographic class formation is an example of social-class formation, the
formation of social ties between members of a class, irrespective of the
speciﬁc subgroup they belong to (such as the social formation of a lower-
class group which consists of individuals belonging to the unskilled, the
semi-skilled, or the skilled groups). Following that idea, the late nine-
teenth century gave rise to the uniﬁcation of the diﬀerent subcategories of
the lower classes on the marriage market, while intermarriage with the
middle class did not increase.17
MARRYING OUT IN BELGIUM
425
In the remainder of this theoretical introduction we shall address these
hypotheses in more depth by discussing diﬀerences in marital mobility
patterns according to social position, type of city, migration status, and so
on. Discussion of them will guide our empirical analysis of relative marital
mobility as we believe that the diﬀerences in marital mobility patterns
measured through these variables will inform us more clearly about the
precise mechanisms underlying societal openness or closure and help us to
deﬁne the necessary control variables. Among these variables, we dis-
tinguish between structural societal factors, personal characteristics, and
marriage-related factors.
Structural factors
The socioeconomic context is the ultimate structural factor inﬂuencing the
relative likelihood of upward marital mobility. Two important charac-
teristics are the sector composition of the economy (industrial or other-
wise ; administrative and commercial functions or not; the size of the
agricultural sector) and its organizational principles (proletarianization;
bureaucratization). That socioeconomic context exerted its inﬂuence
through proximate characteristics, the ﬁrst of which is the composition of
the middle class. To evaluate their inﬂuence we discuss the main sub-
groups.
The old middle class – the petty bourgeoisie and farmers – were, like
any propertied class, anxious not to ruin their property. Furthermore,
their desire to protect their respectability led to a large social distance
from the lower class,18 but there were some factors which facilitated social
interaction with them. The petty bourgeoisie, speciﬁcally master artisans,
might naturally have had the closest links with the lower classes, working
side by side with skilled workers. In the course of the nineteenth century
both groups might even have become virtually identical. Proletarianiz-
ation during the second industrial revolution threatened many old
urban craft sectors,19 leading to societal openness, as the amount of social
power held by that section of the middle class – power to a large extent
based on property – was reduced so that it increasingly resembled the
lower class.
The situation of farmers was somewhat peculiar. People with a farming
background were not typically part of the city’s core group. In our data-
base, most sons and daughters of farmers were migrants whose migration
to the city was usually the result of their threatened social position in a
context of demographic pressure and land division. In the second quarter
of the nineteenth century, and in its ﬁnal decades especially, the Belgian
agricultural sector was in crisis, so children of farmers could be at risk
of downward marriage (but see the discussion of migrants in the next
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section). In short, proletarianization and agricultural decline seem to have
threatened the social power of the old middle class.
The position of the new middle class is perhaps more diﬃcult to assess.
The barrier between non-manual and manual workers could be quite
diﬃcult to breach,20 but recruitment into the non-manual section of
the middle class was arranged by bureaucratic, rational selection pro-
cedures – at least in theory.21 If so, that group would have been the one
most likely to adopt meritocratic values, and might have been the one
most open to intermarriage with some elements of the lower class – that is,
in cases where a lower-class individual was upwardly mobile in his or her
‘bureaucratic ’ career.
A second characteristic concerns the conditions for class formation,
which could vary substantially in diﬀerent cities.22 From the perspective of
social closure it is important to stress that industrial cities typically show
stronger lower-class cohesion, and that was possibly reﬂected in a strong
aversion on the part of the middle class towards the lower class.23
Therefore, one might have expected intermarriage between people from
lower-class and middle-class backgrounds to have been less frequent in
cities such as Ghent, Lie`ge, Verviers, or, somewhat later, Aalst. Yet, ac-
cording to the economic modernization perspective, societal openness
should be strongest in cities combining modern industrial development
with large administrative functions – both sectors are the ones most typi-
cally associated with modern bureaucratic recruitment and promotion
policies. It was in cities such as Ghent or Lie`ge, then, that societal open-
ness should have increased most rapidly.
Personal characteristics
Personal characteristics too can enhance upward mobility. First, there are
characteristics related to an individual’s own position that might be ben-
eﬁcial. Upward intergenerational mobility is, of course, an important tool
for attracting a partner from a higher level.24 Similarly, being raised in a
literate family rather than in one lacking the basic ability even to engage
in a written culture must have improved anyone’s chances of upward
marriage.25 In our view, literacy and participation in literate culture are
together a clear marker of social status. This can be used as a means to
distinguish the ‘good’ or ‘civilized’ members of the lower class.26 The
question is whether upward intergenerational mobility and literacy were
suﬃcient to counter the impact of social origin on marital mobility. If they
were not, that would strongly support the idea that social closure is strong
enough to counter meritocracy.
Second, the ‘respectability ’ and social power of lower-class parents are
important.We can, evidently, expect that children of skilledworkers would
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have had greater opportunities to intermarry with the middle class than
did the children of semi-skilled workers, or of unskilled ones even more
so. Furthermore, those elements of the lower class belonging to the native
‘core of the city population’ were perhaps the ﬁrst to intermarry with the
middle class. In contrast to men and women from rural backgrounds they
might have been more accustomed to the manners and culture of the
middle class.27 Therefore, if only migrants from rural backgrounds failed
to intermarry, while migrants from non-rural backgrounds did inter-
marry, that would suggest that practical barriers induced by migration
were not the only reasons why migrants had less chance of upward marital
mobility. Social closure on cultural grounds was a much more likely ex-
planation in their case.28
Yet all the same, it seems that at times immigrants from rural origins
were particularly eﬃcient in the development of urban trade activity. They
could transfer some of their skills to the butchery, or bakery, or the
restaurant trades, for example, while older craft activities were usually
reserved for the indigenous population.29 In between the old and new
middle classes, such active migrants beneﬁted from urban dynamism and
the development of an urban way of life, under the inﬂuence of bourgeois
culture.30
To that we must add that the relationship between migration and
marital mobility is extremely complicated. As a result of the segmentation
of the marriage market according to geographical origin, the character-
istics of the migrant marriage market are crucial in explaining partner-
selection patterns. We shall control for that in our empirical analysis.31
Marriage
Finally, there are matters more closely related to marriage practices that
might be important. First, one wonders whether age at marriage matters.
Lower-class children who married late had more chance of building up
savings or investing in their careers. At a later age, it might also be clearer
whether a newly achieved social position would be stable or not.32 In
any case, the older one was, the more important was one’s own social
position rather than that of one’s parents. Consequently, lower-class
children who married quite late had more chance of attracting a middle-
class spouse.
Second, whether someone was marrying for the ﬁrst time or not surely
played its part. First marriages have a strong symbolic value, and have
always attracted greater community attention.33 Social closure might be
particularly important for such occasions.34 Second unions are of course
related to the question of age at marriage, and the impact of age on
marital mobility. We must bear in mind that all these marriage-related
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characteristics are important as control variables, but they are not in-
herently connected to the hypotheses discussed above.
1.3 Hypotheses and empirical claims
We end this section by formulating some empirical claims based on our
discussion above. Let us ﬁrst discuss absolute mobility. According to the
proletarianization and agricultural decline hypotheses, the chance of a
person from a lower-class background marrying a middle-class (or elite)
partner would decline with the declining size of the middle class. If, by
contrast, we observe an increase in the size of the new middle class, and in
the chances for persons from the lower classes of marrying upwardly, that
would conﬁrm the ‘new middle class ’ hypothesis.
Next, we turn to relative marital mobility, distinguishing three hy-
potheses about its evolution. First, there is the classic meritocracy hy-
pothesis. Second, there is the hypothesis that states that increased
intermarriage is not the consequence of meritocracy, but of the decline of
the old middle class (proletarianization, agricultural decline). Third, there
is the social closure hypothesis, which denies an increase in societal
openness in times of economic modernization. These three hypotheses
lead to divergent empirical claims in terms of the evolution of the marital
mobility pattern. If relative upward mobility increased for the lower
classes, that conﬁrms the meritocracy hypothesis, the proletarianization
hypothesis, or the agricultural decline hypothesis. If not, it conﬁrms the
social closure hypothesis. The hypotheses also imply divergent expecta-
tions in terms of where evolutions can be expected. If upward marital
mobility was most easily attained in cities with a modern economy and
strong administrative functions, that would support the meritocracy
hypothesis. If lower-class children were less likely to marry upwardly
in purely industrial cities, that would support the social closure hypo-
thesis.
We shall perform a more detailed analysis focusing on a series of vari-
ables that might, or might not, have enhanced marriage chances, as an
extra test which will give us more information on the validity of the
diﬀerent hypotheses. First, it is important to know what section of
the middle class was the most likely to accept (or to have to accept)
intermarriage with the lower class. If it was the children of the petty
bourgeoisie, that would conﬁrm the proletarianization hypothesis. If the
children of farmers were the ones most likely to intermarry with the lower
class, that would conﬁrm the agricultural decline hypothesis. If the chil-
dren of the new middle class were the most likely, that would support the
meritocracy hypothesis.
MARRYING OUT IN BELGIUM
429
Second, it is important to know which characteristics of a lower-class
background enhanced the chances of upward marriage. If rural migrants
had less chance of intermarrying, that would support the social closure
hypothesis. Furthermore, if individuals from lower-class backgrounds but
who were literate and had experienced upward intergenerational mobility
had a similar chance of marrying middle-class or elite partners as middle-
class individuals did, that would support the meritocracy hypothesis. If
not, it would support the social closure hypothesis.
2. DATA AND CONTEXT
2.1 Marriage certiﬁcates
We have used marriage certiﬁcates from civil registration registers which
are available for the entire nineteenth century. The certiﬁcates contain
information about the actual marriages, some demographic history of the
spouses and their parents, their occupations,35 their places of residence,
and so on. For this study, we made use of several datasets which were
constructed during previous research. Diﬀerent sampling strategies were
used: for Ghent, one in twelve marriage certiﬁcates was included, and for
Lie`ge one in ten; for Verviers an alphabetical sample was extracted based
on the letter B, while for Leuven and Aalst we abstracted one in three
marriage certiﬁcates. We have 8,575 marriage certiﬁcates for Ghent, 9,330
for Leuven, 5,496 for Aalst, 5,511 for Lie`ge, and 3,459 for Verviers. The
database contains information for the period 1800–1913, though for the
Walloon cities of Lie`ge and Verviers it ends at 1890.
2.2 Context description
Ghent and Lie`ge are the biggest cities in the sample, with 160,000 and
148,000 inhabitants respectively in 1900. The other cities were consider-
ably smaller. Verviers numbered 49,000 inhabitants in 1900, Leuven
42,000, and Aalst 29,000.
In the nineteenth century Belgium pioneered industrial revolution on
the European continent, but in a highly polarized way. For the cotton and
woollen textile industry, Ghent and Verviers were most advanced in terms
of mechanization and workforce from the end of the eighteenth century
onwards. Ghent was a historic city. Its economy was based mainly on
cotton, though other branches of the textile sector and engineering were
important too. In the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth century its population
doubled and migration increased, and with that came a lower standard of
living.36 In the second half of the nineteenth century population growth
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slowed. Unlike Ghent, Verviers was a small centre which underwent a
phase of urban crisis similar to Ghent’s in the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth
century.37 An agglomeration grew progressively along the river Vesdre.
The textile city of Aalst participated in a second wave of industrializa-
tion. In the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth century it was a quiet, almost
medieval city, where before 1880–1890 factories were still small with fewer
than 100 workers. But from about that time industry expanded, factories
became larger, and newly established manufacturers appeared who had to
compete with already well-established ﬁrms in the big cities, so they
exploited their labour forces intensively, imposing working conditions
even worse than elsewhere.38
During the 1820s, mechanization in the textile industry prompted the
modernization of the iron industry, with its coke-ﬁred blast furnaces, and
of coal-mining in the area around Lie`ge. Lie`ge itself was a large city, like
Ghent, with many professional men and shopkeepers working alongside
both traditional artisans, such as weapon-makers, and newer types of
workers including coal-miners.39 Lie`ge was an old town right in the centre
of a coal basin and attracted around itself a more or less coherent in-
dustrial agglomeration.40
Leuven was originally a medium-sized town with no very strong in-
dustrialization in the nineteenth century, although it lost the traditional
craft and agricultural roots of its economy.41 Its transformation was very
gradual and did not lead to many large-scale business enterprises or fac-
tories ; rather Leuven played an important part in administration and
education.
3. METHOD
3.1 Variables
Occupational information is the only information we have to measure
class, and the occupations in the databases were coded using the HISCO
scheme.42 The next step was to combine HISCO codes into classes, using a
class scheme, for which purpose we used the SOCPO scheme.43 The
SOCPO scheme is composed of ﬁve social power levels, labelled ‘elite ’,
‘middle class ’, ‘skilled workers’, ‘semi-skilled workers’, and ‘unskilled
workers’. Occupations are coded as middle class if they refer to one of the
following categories : medium-scale proprietors, typically master artisans,
merchants, shopkeepers (the petty bourgeoisie), and farmers; non-manual
skilled workers, such as clerks ; and lower management, or ‘medium
commanders ’. The class consists of both the old and new middle classes.44
Occupational information is not, of course, without problems.
Occupational titles might for example refer to diﬀerent types of work in
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diﬀerent contexts. To cope with that problem, we proceeded cautiously.
First, the SOCPO scheme is an explicit one based on a clear theory and a
detailed coding procedure. Second, it has been empirically validated. The
ﬁve social power levels diﬀer clearly in terms of indicators of standard of
living such as literacy, height, and wages.45 Finally, we admit that group-
ing all ‘ farmers ’ into a single class is a simpliﬁcation. One must, however,
bear in mind that the data analysed are urban areas with few farmers.46
3.2 Analysis
In this analysis, we take the perspective of grooms from a lower-class
background and measure their chances of marrying a middle-class or elite
bride. That requires some explanation.
First, in line with the theoretical section, we focused our analysis on the
social origin of bride and groom by reference to the social position of their
fathers. Second, we considered the chances of marrying a middle-class or
elite bride, since one of our principal aims is to evaluate the impact of
upward intergenerational mobility on marital mobility. We have no
means of measuring female class positions satisfactorily because there are
so many cases where information on the occupation of the bride is vague
or non-existent. We do not of course think the question is inherently un-
interesting, but for the moment its analysis is not feasible. Third, even
though we are interested in the chances for the lower classes of marrying
upwardly, in the theoretical section we focused primarily on evaluating
the chances of marrying a middle-class partner. Obviously, for the lower
classes there was a greater likelihood of marrying a middle-class than an
elite partner, but having chosen upward marriage as the dependent vari-
able we are theoretically interested in any upward marriage. We did not
want to run into the diﬃculties of splitting the sample into the chances of
marrying an elite bride rather than a middle-class one. We consider a
marriage with either as upward marital mobility.
To organize the empirical research we distinguished ﬁve steps. Step 1
was a descriptive analysis of social structure and absolute marital
mobility. We focused on the size of the middle class and its composition,
measured by classifying the HISCO codes deﬁned as ‘middle class ’ into
three groups: the new middle class (clerical workers, scientists, managers,
and so on), the petty bourgeoisie (merchants, self-employed artisans), and
farmers. That step allowed us to examine the impact of economic mod-
ernization by relating the changes in social structure to absolute marital
mobility rates.
As step 2 we examined the evolution of relative marital mobility
during the nineteenth century and the diﬀerences among the cities in our
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database. For these purposes, we performed a simple logistic regression
analysis to examine our main question, namely whether the chance of
marrying a middle-class or elite bride diﬀered according to the social
origin of the groom, and whether that diﬀerence changed over time.
We developed a series of models to execute step 2. Model 1A is the basic
model and contains period, city, and the social origin of the groom as
independent variables. In model 1B we added group size47 to measure
relative mobility chances. To measure chances over time and among cities
we added interaction terms between both variables and the social origin of
the groom in, respectively, models 1C and 1D. To control for the eﬀect of
the segmentation of the marriage market by geographical origin, we ran
variant models that included a ‘homogamy according to geographical
origin’ variable (models 2A–D). Couples were categorized into this vari-
able by taking into account the geographical origin of both groom and
bride. The variable has the following categories : ‘native groom and native
bride ’, ‘native groom and rural migrant bride’, ‘native groom and urban
migrant bride’, ‘ rural migrant groom and native bride ’, ‘ rural migrant
groom and rural migrant bride’, ‘rural migrant groom and urban migrant
bride ’, ‘urban migrant groom and native bride’, ‘urban migrant groom
and rural migrant bride’, and ‘urban migrant groom and urban migrant
bride ’.
While in steps 1 and 2 we examined the general patterns in absolute and
relative marital mobility, the further steps focus on a more detailed
analysis of who married whom, which will enable us to shed more light on
the variant claims (meritocracy, proletarianization, agricultural decline,
social closure).
In step 3 we examined the inﬂow of lower-class sons into diﬀerent
middle-class categories (new middle class, petty bourgeoisie, and farmers)
in every city.
In step 4 we examined what factors help to explain why some lower-
class sons succeeded in marrying upwardly. We used model 3, containing
period, city, social origin of groom, and homogamy according to geo-
graphical origin as the standard independent variables, and added the
literacy of the groom, the social position of the groom, and his age at
marriage (<24,>24 and<28,>28) and his matrimonial status (whether
it was his ﬁrst marriage or not) as new independent variables.48 To avoid
numerous interaction terms, we limited step 4 to grooms of lower-class
background.
In step 5 we evaluated the chances of someone from the ‘best part of the
lower classes’ marrying a middle-class or elite bride. If individuals be-
longing to even that category had less chance than those from the middle
class itself of marrying a middle-class or elite bride, that would conﬁrm
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the social closure hypothesis. For that step we used model 4, which in-
cludes period, city, group size, and homogamy according to geographical
origin, but added a new variable to distinguish between the ‘best part ’ of
the lower class and the rest of them, based on the results of step 4. (By the
‘best part ’ of the lower class we refer to those who had the characteristics
that gave them the best chances of marrying upwardly.) The variable
combines information on the social origin, social position, age, and liter-
acy of the groom.49
4. RE SULTS
4.1 The social structure and absolute marital mobility
Table 1 shows the evolution of the size of the middle class in each city. In
the biggest cities, Ghent and Lie`ge, and in Verviers the middle class did
not increase during the nineteenth century. In those early industrializing
cities, any increase in the size of the middle class was, apparently, com-
pensated for by an increase in the size of the lower classes. In late-in-
dustrializing Aalst and non-industrial Leuven the relative size of the
middle class decreased sharply.
Next we turn to the composition of the middle class (data not shown).
In Ghent, the new middle class was relatively large, but it barely increased
over time. After 1890 about 7.5 per cent of fathers of brides were part of
the ‘new’ middle class, who accounted for about 30 per cent of the total
middle class. In Lie`ge the proportion of the new middle class was some-
what lower in the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth century, with 4.1 per cent
of all brides’ fathers belonging to the new middle class, but later,
between 1874 and 1890, that ﬁgure increased to about 7.5 per cent. For
Aalst, Leuven, and Verviers, the new middle class was smaller compared
with Ghent and Lie`ge. The percentage of fathers of brides belonging to
the new middle class was never larger than 4.5 per cent. At the same time,
we observed a decline of the old middle class in Aalst, Leuven, Verviers,
and Lie`ge. For the petty bourgeoisie the most dramatic evolution was in
Leuven, with a decrease of 11 percentage points, while for Ghent the
proportion remained stable at about 8.4 per cent. The same pattern is
visible for farmers, for whom the decline was most dramatic in Aalst and
Leuven, where there was a decrease of about 11 percentage points.
To conclude, we can state ﬁrmly that in none of these cities did economic
changes lead to a suﬃcient increase in the numbers of the new middle class
to bring about any major structural changes to the marriage market.
In Table 2 we present the percentages of grooms with a speciﬁc social
origin who succeeded in marrying a middle-class or elite bride. These
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ﬁgures reﬂect the evolution of the social structure. For Leuven and Aalst,
two cities that experienced a sharp decline of the middle class, the chances
for a groom with a lower-class background of marrying upwardly de-
creased dramatically. While in the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth century the
chance of marrying upwardly was relatively large (between 35 and 27 per
cent in Leuven; between 45 and 32 per cent in Aalst), it declined to less
than 20 per cent. In the other cities there was hardly any evolution. These
TABLE 1
The evolution of the social structure, measured by the distribution of the
social position of the fathers of brides (row %), in Aalst, Ghent, Leuven,
Lie`ge and Verviers (1800–1913)
Elite Middle-class Skilled Semi-skilled Unskilled
AALST
1800–1850 5 43.2 19.6 13.2 18.9
1851–1873 3.3 29.7 25 13.6 28.5
1874–1890 4.3 28.8 17.2 14.2 35.6
1891–1913 4.4 24.8 23.7 26.7 20.4
N 106 751 535 466 599
GHENT
1800–1850 7.7 24.2 31.7 19.9 16.5
1851–1873 6.5 25.9 32.3 13.2 22.1
1874–1890 5.4 27.5 31.3 14.4 21.5
1891–1913 6.6 24.8 30.1 20 18.5
N 247 946 1162 656 718
LEUVEN
1800–1850 9.5 45.6 14.3 16.6 13.9
1851–1873 6.7 38.2 18.6 19.4 17
1874–1890 11 26.6 18.6 25.6 18.2
1891–1913 9.9 23.8 38.5 13.1 14.8
N 372 1329 952 697 617
VERVIERS
1800–1850 4.1 32.9 17.3 30.2 15.6
1851–1873 3.8 28.4 21 31.7 15.1
1874–1890 7.5 28.1 25.8 24.7 13.9
N 80 454 342 452 230
LIEGE
1800–1850 8.3 23.1 24.9 25.6 18.1
1851–1873 11 18.4 28 17.5 25.2
1874–1890 10.1 23.2 32.4 16.5 17.9
N 231 477 661 420 478
Source: Samples of marriage certiﬁcates in civil registration registers of the cities of Aalst,
Ghent, Leuven, Verviers and Lie`ge.
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results do not leave much doubt. Economic modernization did not lead to
increased absolute chances of marrying upwardly for lower-class sons.
4.2 Relative marital mobility
Table 3 shows the results of the logistic regression analysis. The chance of
marrying a middle-class or elite bride was clearly lower after the ﬁrst half
of the nineteenth century (model 1A). Note that such is the logical
TABLE 2
Chances, by social origin, of marrying a middle-class or elite bride (%) in
Aalst, Ghent, Leuven, Lie`ge and Verviers (1800–1913)
Elite Middle-class Skilled Semi-skilled Unskilled
AALST
1800–1850 58.3 52.9 44.9 35.7 31.6
1851–1873 87.5 53.8 25.4 16.7 12.9
1874–1890 84.6 42 19.1 10.3 11.2
1891–1913 50 43.3 15.3 18.2 17.4
N 63 395 299 267 322
GHENT
1800–1850 86.8 47.2 22.8 19.5 5.6
1851–1873 79.3 48.8 20.2 9.5 12.7
1874–1890 85.7 44 24.6 24.5 15.8
1891–1913 68.1 49.2 21.5 19.7 16.8
N 128 468 633 325 382
LEUVEN
1800–1850 76.1 57.9 34.6 30.5 27.1
1851–1873 87.5 57.9 30.3 17.8 15.7
1874–1890 77.1 41 35.4 8 13.2
1891–1913 75.9 36.9 18.8 18.7 13.3
N 188 656 526 349 309
VERVIERS
1800–1850 80 48.2 51.9 22.7 23.5
1851–1873 84.2 34.1 22.7 17.5 25.4
1874–1890 64 46.8 23.4 19.7 12.1
N 54 259 192 258 117
LIEGE
1800–1850 71.4 55.4 25 20 11.5
1851–1873 55.7 45.4 23.6 17 16.3
1874–1890 59.6 40.4 25.6 21.4 21.2
N 123 252 321 213 253
Source : Samples of marriage certiﬁcates in civil registration registers of the cities of Aalst,
Ghent, Leuven, Verviers and Lie`ge.
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TABLE 3
Logistic regression analysis of the chances of marrying a middle-class or elite bride in Aalst, Ghent, Leuven, Lie`ge
and Verviers (1800–1913) (models 1A–D, 2A–D)
Model 1A Model 1B Model 1C Model 1D Model 2A Model 2B Model 2C Model 2D
Period
1800–1850
1851–1873 0.754*** 0.998 1.104 1.026 0.720*** 0.925 0.984 0.946
1874–1890 0.700*** 1.012 1.011 1.039 0.679*** 0.943 0.886 0.962
1891–1913 0.629*** 1.019 1.111 1.042 0.594*** 0.916 0.950 0.936
Social origin groom
Middle-class
Elite 2.956*** 3.022*** 3.245*** 2.050** 3.147*** 3.194*** 3.139*** 1.772*
Skilled 0.371*** 0.380*** 0.441*** 0.338*** 0.412*** 0.420*** 0.459*** 0.345***
Semi-skilled 0.271*** 0.275*** 0.310*** 0.281*** 0.293*** 0.296*** 0.321*** 0.285***
Unskilled 0.225*** 0.230*** 0.207*** 0.230*** 0.230*** 0.234*** 0.203*** 0.236***
City
Aalst
Ghent 0.98 0.981 0.980 1.03 0.856* 0.858* 0.856* 0.860
Leuven 1.083 0.87 0.889 0.792* 0.942 0.775** 0.793** 0.669**
Verviers 0.953 1.049 1.063 0.811 0.688** 0.752** 0.759** 0.568**
Lie`ge 0.894 0.909 0.911 0.916 0.670*** 0.683*** 0.681*** 0.675**
Geographical homogamy
Groom and bride are natives
Groom is native, bride is rural migrant 2.362*** 2.340*** 0.479*** 2.362***
Groom is native, bride is urban migrant 1.410** 1.397** 1.119 1.406**
Groom is rural migrant, bride is native 1.289 1.291** 0.669** 1.282**
Groom and bride are rural migrants 2.595 2.523*** 0.614*** 2.620***
TABLE 3 (Con t . )
Model 1A Model 1B Model 1C Model 1D Model 2A Model 2B Model 2C Model 2D
Groom is rural migrant, bride is
urban migrant
1.647 1.639** 1.214 1.638**
Groom is urban migrant, bride is native 1.601 1.615*** 0.788 1.592***
Groom is urban migrant, bride is
rural migrant
2.580 2.590*** 0.770** 2.566***
Groom and bride are urban migrants 2.079 2.081*** 1.241 2.045***
Group size 1.041*** 1.041*** 1.044*** 1.037*** 1.036*** 1.040***
Period * Social origin
1851–1873 * elite 0.894 1.065
1851–1873 * skilled 0.809 0.852
1851–1873 * semi-skilled 0.723 0.743
1851–1873 * unskilled 1.097 1.136
1874–1890 * elite 0.959 1.106
1874–1890 * skilled 1.043 1.157
1874–1890 * semi-skilled 0.844 0.928
1874–1890 * unskilled 1.130 1.168
1891–1913 * elite 0.885 0.920
1891–1913 * skilled 0.704* 0.762
1891–1913 * semi-skilled 0.978 1.027
1891–1913 * unskilled 1.186 1.289
City * social origin
Ghent * elite 1.905* 2.329**
Ghent * skilled 0.923 1.032
Ghent * semi-skilled 0.920 0.990
Ghent * unskilled 0.753 0.744
Leuven * elite 2.052** 2.431**
Leuven * skilled 1.221 1.367
Leuven * semi-skilled 0.886 0.987
Leuven * unskilled 0.986 1.024
Verviers * elite 2.049 2.661**
Verviers * skilled 1.632* 1.662*
Verviers * semi-skilled 1.221 1.299
Verviers * unskilled 1.752* 1.743*
Lie`ge * elite 0.815 1.117
Lie`ge * skilled 1.166 1.258
Lie`ge * semi-skilled 1.013 1.024
Lie`ge * unskilled 1.037 0.915
Constant 1.157* 0.239*** 0.227*** 0.225*** 0.945 0.229*** 0.486** 0.226***
N 7352 7352 7352 7352 7230 7230 7230 7230
Signiﬁcance *<0.10; **<0.05;
***<0.001
Nagelkerke R2 0.174 0.178 0.180 0.183 0.198 0.202 0.203 0.206
Source : Samples of marriage certiﬁcates in civil registration registers of the cities of Aalst, Ghent, Leuven, Verviers and Lie`ge.
consequence of the decrease in the size of the middle class, which is shown
by controlling for group size (model 1B). The results in model 1 show
diﬀerences in grooms according to their social origin. The elite were more
likely to marry a middle-class or elite bride compared with the middle-
class. Grooms from a lower-class background were less likely. Those
ﬁndings are, of course, as expected and not controversial.
More important is the question of how those diﬀerences by social origin
evolved. Model 1C shows the results of a model that includes interaction
terms for period and social origin, which then enables us to determine
whether the diﬀerent marriage chances changed over time. It is clear that
they did not. Figure 1 shows the results, calculated so that the evolution of
the diﬀerent marriage chances of each type of groom are compared with
the evolution of the chances of grooms from a middle-class background
(set at 1 for the whole period).
There is no indication that lower-class sons found it easier to attract a
middle-class or elite bride in the second half of the nineteenth century,
which is the ﬁnding giving the most straightforward support to the claim
that meritocracy was not strong enough to reshape partner-selection
patterns so that it became easier for lower-class sons to marry upwardly.
Nor did agricultural decline or proletarianization weaken the position of
the old middle class enough to mean that they were increasingly obliged to
accept intermarriage with the lower class.50
F IGURE 1. Evolution of the diﬀerent chances by social origin of marrying a middle-class or
elite bride in Aalst, Ghent, Leuven, Lie`ge and Verviers (1800–1913) (model 1C). (Source :
Samples of marriage certiﬁcates in civil registration registers of the cities of Aalst, Ghent,
Leuven, Verviers and Lie`ge.)
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In model 1D we added interaction terms for the location and social
origin of the groom to model 1B. Figure 2 shows the patterns for the ﬁve
cities, with the values for the middle class set at 1 for the whole period.
The results indicate that there were few diﬀerences among the cities in
terms of diﬀerent marriage chances. The early-industrial cities of Ghent
and Verviers (and Lie`ge) do not diﬀer systematically from Leuven or from
late-industrial Aalst.
So, while the lack of a general increase in upward mobility is evidence
against the meritocracy hypothesis, the lack of diﬀerences between in-
dustrial and non-industrial cities is not very supportive of the social
closure hypothesis. On the other hand, it has been demonstrated before
for the industrial cities of Ghent and Aalst after 1890 – and, using the
same class scheme, for some districts in the United Kingdom51 – that the
social closure strategy led to demographic class formation in such a way
that intermarriage within the lower classes increased, while intermarriage
with the middle class remained stable. In other words, social closure was
not so strong that it dramatically reduced the likelihood of upward mar-
riage, but that did not prevent the internal boundaries within the lower
class from becoming more permeable in industrial cities.
This section ends with a short note on the inﬂuence of migration. As
outlined in the theoretical section, segmentation of the marriage market
F IGURE 2. Diﬀerent chances by social origin of marrying a middle-class or elite bride in
Aalst, Ghent, Leuven, Lie`ge and Verviers (1800–1913), diﬀerences between the cities (model
1D). (Source: Samples of marriage certiﬁcates in civil registration registers of the cities of
Aalst, Ghent, Leuven, Verviers and Lie`ge.)
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might well have had an impact on partner-selection patterns. In models
2A–D we added homogamy according to geographical origin to model 1.
The ﬁndings, presented in Table 3, show that there probably was seg-
mentation. Grooms who married on the ‘rural ’ marriage market (those
grooms marrying rural migrants) had more chance of marrying upwardly,
and that was related to the high proportion of children of farmers among
those migrants. If one married a rural migrant, then one automatically
had a greater chance of marrying a middle-class bride. Those who married
on the non-rural market had somewhat less chance of doing so, while
those marrying on the native marriage market were the least likely to
do so.
However, it is important for our purposes that adding this migration
variable should not alter the conclusions arrived at using model 1 above.
It is apparent that possible changes in the segmentation of the marriage
market or in the number of migrants were not strong enough to inﬂuence
the parameters obtained by model 1.
Much more can be said about migration and marital mobility, but that
is beyond the scope of this article. But one interesting ﬁnding appears
when we compare the results for each category in which the bride was a
native. Rural migrants, and particularly urban migrants who did marry a
native partner had more chance than native grooms of marrying up-
wardly, and we shall discuss that in somewhat more detail in section 4.4,
below.
4.3 Who married downwardly?
In the next steps we shall examine in more detail who married whom in
order to get more insight into the ﬁndings of the previous section. First we
examine the marriage market from the perspective of the middle class (see
Table 4). Which category of the middle class was most likely to accept a
downward marriage? Note that for each of the subgroups of the middle
class the structural chance of marrying a lower-class partner was the same.
For this reason comparison of the percentages in Table 4 teaches us
something about the diﬀerences in preferences for marrying a lower-class
partner.
Daughters of farmers in the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth century were not
very likely to marry a groom from the lower class (about 50 to 65 per cent
did not), but that percentage dropped in the late nineteenth century. The
pattern for the petty bourgeoisie was somewhat diﬀerent in each city. In
Ghent, and particularly in Leuven, the daughters of the petty bourgeoisie
increasingly had to accept downward marriage, while in Aalst and Lie`ge
there was no change and in Verviers there was a modest increase. Finally,
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the pattern for the new middle class was somewhat clearer. In most cities,
new middle class daughters did not show an increase in downward marital
mobility.
As a result of such evolutions, in these Flemish cities in the ﬁnal period
of observation the new middle class was more able than the other com-
ponents of the middle class to prevent downward mobility, although that
was less evident in the Walloon cities of Verviers and Lie`ge. In contrast,
TABLE 4
Percentages of brides from diﬀerent middle-class subgroups who did not
marry a groom with a lower-class background, in Aalst, Ghent, Leuven,
Lie`ge and Verviers (1800–1913) (row %)
Social origin
of bride:
New middle
class Petty bourgeoisie Farmers
AALST
1800–1850 27.3 40 65.4
1851–1874 28.6 47.1 65.8
1875–1890 40 50 64.9
1891–1913 60 46.2 47.8
N 33 82 219
GHENT
1800–1850 50 60.5 55.9
1851–1874 46.7 44.1 66.7
1875–1890 45.8 40 47.5
1891–1913 60 41.3 44.9
N 116 177 173
LEUVEN
1800–1850 68.4 72.3 65.9
1851–1874 40 65.8 68.3
1875–1890 46.7 46.7 73
1891–1913 56.7 33.3 47.8
N 74 220 228
VERVIERS
1800–1850 16.7 47.6 52.4
1851–1874 47.6 42.9 35.6
1875–1890 54.5 61.1 48.6
N 38 53 115
LIEGE
1800–1850 42.9 62.5 58.1
1851–1874 58.3 57.9 55.8
1875–1890 47.8 55.6 42.9
N 66 63 102
Source : Samples of marriage certiﬁcates in civil registration registers of the cities of Aalst,
Ghent, Leuven, Verviers and Lie`ge.
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TABLE 5
Logistic regression analysis of the chances of marrying a middle-class or
elite bride in Aalst, Ghent, Leuven, Lie`ge and Verviers (1800–1913), model 3
(grooms with a lower-class background) and 4 (all grooms)
Model 3 Model 4
Period
1800–1850
1851–1873 0.829 0.952
1874–1890 0.886 0.985
1891–1913 0.878 0.989
Social origin groom
Skilled
Semi-skilled 0.852
Unskilled 0.811*
City
Aalst
Ghent 0.672** 0.895
Leuven 0.570*** 0.760*
Verviers 0.573** 0.772**
Lie`ge 0.337*** 0.663***
Social position groom
Middle-class
Elite 1.570
Skilled 0.472***
Semi-skilled 0.350***
Unskilled 0.287***
Migrant status
Groom and bride are natives
Groom is native, bride is rural migrant 3.184*** 2.726***
Groom is native, bride is urban migrant 1.527** 1.454**
Groom is rural migrant, bride is native 1.518** 1.306**
Groom and bride are rural migrants 3.403*** 3.041***
Groom is rural migrant, bride is urban migrant 1.682* 1.724**
Groom is urban migrant, bride is native 1.405** 1.476***
Groom is urban migrant, bride is rural migrant 3.689*** 3.104***
Groom and bride are urban migrants 1.856** 2.133***
Illiteracy of groom
Can read and write
Cannot read and write 0.496***
Age of groom
Younger than 24
Between 25 and 28 1.136
Older than 28 1.677***
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the new middle class was the component least able to prevent downward
marital mobility during the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth century, in both the
Flemish and Walloon cities.
In our view, that ﬁnding brings some nuance to the conclusion of the
previous section. Even though, in general, there was no increase in relative
upward mobility for lower-class sons, in this section, based on more
speciﬁc information taking into account the diﬀerent positions of the
diﬀerent subgroups of the middle class, the ﬁgures support the view that
proletarianization of the middle class, in some cities, and agricultural de-
cline in almost every city, diminished the social distance between the ‘old’
middle class and the lower class. And apparently, the meritocratization of
the new middle class did not result in increased intermarriage with the
lower classes, in fact quite the contrary. But those changes were not strong
enough to aﬀect the general pattern.
4.4 Who married upwardly?
In this section we limit our analysis to lower-class grooms. In model 3 (see
Table 5) we included variables that we thought could be related to an
TABLE 5 (Cont.)
Model 3 Model 4
Brides group size 1.058*** 1.044***
Matrimonial status of groom
Not married before
Married before 1.231 1.413**
Social origin+social position groom
Father middle-class and groom middle-class or elite
Father middle-class and groom lower-class 0.327***
Father elite and groom lower-class 0.481**
Father elite and groom middle-class or elite 2.560***
Father lower-class and groom middle-class or
elite, literate and older than 28
0.601**
Father lower-class and groom lower-class
or not in previous category
0.150***
Constant 0.127*** 0.312**
N 4068 6659
Signiﬁcance *<0.10; **<0.05; ***<0.001
Nagelkerke R2 0.143 0.253
Source : Samples of marriage certiﬁcates in civil registration registers of the cities of Aalst,
Ghent, Leuven, Verviers and Lie`ge.
MARRYING OUT IN BELGIUM
445
upward marriage, such as social origin, social position, literacy, age at
marriage, and matrimonial status. Sons of skilled workers had more
chances of marrying upwardly, yet controlling for all these independent
variables made the direct eﬀect of social origin insigniﬁcant at the 0.05
signiﬁcance level. The groom’s own social position was important and
signiﬁcant. Those who themselves remained in the lower classes had lower
chances of marrying upwardly, but the diﬀerence between sons who at-
tained an elite position and those who attained a middle-class position
was not signiﬁcant.52 Literacy too was important. Grooms who were un-
able to sign their marriage certiﬁcate had half the chances of upward
marriage of those who could. Both variables show that achievement did
play a role, in the sense that upward intergenerational mobility and par-
ticipation in literate culture could be translated into upward marital
mobility.
Perhaps related to that is the inﬂuence of age at marriage. The chance of
marrying a middle-class or elite bride was 1.7 times greater for sons who
married after their twenty-eighth birthday compared with sons who
married by the time they were 24. While we expected a positive eﬀect from
age at marriage, we were somewhat surprised by its magnitude.
Apparently, lower-class grooms who could save, or perhaps establish a
solid career, were better able to attract a middle-class or elite bride. There
is no eﬀect from remarriage, but the number of remarrying grooms for
whom we have information on the father’s occupation is very limited (136
observations for the whole sample in Table 4).
For the lower classes we ﬁnd that rural migrants and non-rural mi-
grants who married a native partner had more chance than native grooms
of marrying a middle-class or elite bride. That is a puzzling ﬁnding. Rural
migrants were not the ones most likely to be part of the core of the city
population and they even tended to be particularly unpopular.53 From a
social closure perspective, they were the ones one might have expected to
be least likely to contract an upward marriage. On the other hand, the
ﬁnding is consistent with the dynamic economic activities of rural mi-
grants in the food sector, as described in the theoretical section, above.
Perhaps it is more illuminating to look at the results from the perspec-
tive of the native working class. One cannot exclude the possibility that
they were more reluctant to intermingle with the middle class and the elite,
and perhaps the high level of social cohesion among them contributed to
that. In other words, social origin was not necessarily as important so-
cially for migrants as for non-migrants, which conforms to Sewell’s in-
terpretation of the lack of social mobility of the native working class in
nineteenth-century Marseille, which he attributes to their adherence to
their working-class identity.54
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4.5 Meritocracy or social closure?
From the previous section we learned that grooms from a lower-class
background who succeeded in achieving a higher social position for
themselves, who were literate, or who married rather later had more
chance of attracting a middle-class or elite bride. A crucial test is whether
grooms who combined all those characteristics had as much chance as
grooms already from a middle-class background of marrying upwardly. If
so, that would mean there was at least some meritocracy, that is, that the
few who really succeeded in achieving a good position did not encounter
many problems in entering higher social circles.
Thus in the next analysis we examine whether ‘the best of the lower
class ’ were able to attract a middle-class or elite bride. In Table 5 (model
4) we compare the chances of marrying a middle-class or elite bride for
elite, middle-class, and lower-class sons. In the latter category, we dis-
tinguish those sons who improved their situation by upward intergenera-
tional mobility (middle-class or elite position) and by literacy, and who
had waited long enough to marry.
The results show that they did indeed have more chance than other
lower-class sons of marrying upwardly, yet they still had signiﬁcantly less
chance of doing so than middle-class sons had of marrying a middle-class
or elite bride. Even that upper level of the lower-class group could not
‘make it ’ on the basis of their own achievements. In our interpretation,
that provides yet more support for the social closure hypothesis.
We should bear in mind, however, that middle-class sons who were not
able to maintain their position had less chance of marrying a middle-class
or elite bride than sons who can be deﬁned as the ‘best part of the lower
class ’. If we use the latter group as the reference category, the parameter
was 0.523 (p=0.005) for middle-class sons who did not maintain their
position. However, we must not over-interpret that ﬁnding. Our ‘best part
of the lower class ’ contained about 2 per cent of the whole lower-class
group. Given its tiny size, there is little to be gained from exploring this
group further, for example according to time and place.
5. CONCLUS ION
In the theoretical section we stated that the main test of the relationship
between economic modernization and societal openness concerned the
evolution during the nineteenth century of the chances for individuals
from a lower-class background of experiencing upward marital mobility.
In terms of absolute mobility, we found that in the non-industrial city of
Leuven and the late-industrial city of Aalst, the decline of the old middle
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class led to a decreasing chance for the lower classes of marrying up-
wardly. For those cities, the proletarianization and agricultural decline
hypotheses for absolute marital mobility are supported. For the other
cities, there was no such eﬀect, but neither was there support for the view
that the rise of the new middle class reshaped marriage patterns. In short,
for the lower classes economic modernization did not have positive eﬀects
on absolute upward marital mobility. At best, their chances of marrying a
middle-class or elite partner did not decrease.
The conclusion in terms of relative marital mobility is also clear. The
chances of marrying upwardly remained stable, and that is evidence
against the meritocracy hypothesis, which claims that economic moder-
nization gradually led to increased societal openness, and also against the
proletarianization and the agricultural decline hypotheses, which claim
that due to those processes the old middle class, while formally keeping its
middle-class occupational titles, became ‘informally’ devalued and had to
accept intermarriage with the lower classes. However, note, as explained
above, that the latter transitions did reshape the social structure.
Apparently, social closure was strong enough to counter any trend to-
wards upward marital mobility.
Some further ﬁndings corroborate our conclusions. First, as particu-
larly the new middle class showed no sign of increased intermarriage with
the lower class, that is evidence against the meritocracy hypothesis.
Second, as personal characteristics such as literacy and intergenerational
mobility did not lead to a complete acceptance within the middle class or
the elite, that too is not supportive of the meritocracy hypothesis.
The social closure hypothesis was the one most strongly supported.
However, that does not mean that all our evidence is in favour of it. First,
rural migrants did not have less chance of marrying a middle-class or elite
bride, which one might otherwise have expected in cases where social
closure principles determined partner selection. Second, there is no sign
that the lower classes had less chance of marrying a middle-class partner
in industrial cities, which, again, would have been likely from the social
closure perspective. Altogether, we do not think those observations are
crucial. In our opinion, in the nineteenth century strategies of social
closure, even in industrial cities, remained strong enough to prevent an
increase of intermarriage between lower-class grooms and middle-class or
elite brides.55
The present study does of course have its limits. For example, the
analyses presented above examine partner selection only from the
perspective of the lower-class groom. It is an open question whether
the same results would be found if we took the perspective of lower-class
women.
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Finally, as a general conclusion, it is important to state that our results
are based on a database derived from the most modern economies of
Belgium, and therefore of continental Europe at the time. As there is no
support found in it for the meritocracy hypothesis, that implies that it is
not very likely that meritocracy strongly aﬀected marital mobility any-
where in the nineteenth century, unless there were other conditions, not
strictly related to economic modernization, that stimulated meritocracy.
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